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"CHARITIES FOR DEFINITE PERSONS"
RALPH H.

DWAN t

The title is borrowed from an appendix of Gray, The Rule Against
Perpetuities.1 Professor Gray challenged the common statement that a
charitable trust must be for an indefinite number of persons. That statement usually is made in cases where it is contended that the possible beneficiaries of an attempted charitable trust are too indefinite. The answer
often given to that contention is that the beneficiaries of a charitable trust
may be and indeed must be indefinite. Professor Gray gave numerous
examples of trusts held to be charitable where the only possible beneficiaries
at a given time are definite and ascertainable. He contended that such beneficiaries have a right to relief, subject to the qualification that the Attorney
General is a necessary party to a suit to carry out the trust. The purpose
of this article is to pursue the subject further with particular reference to
the American cases.
This investigation raises the question of whether or not there is a clear
dividing line between all charitable trusts and all private trusts. It is true
that the typical charitable trust differs in several respects from the typical
private trust. The principal features peculiar to the typical charitable trust
may be stated as follows: (i) the beneficiaries are indefinite; (2) there is
a valid perpetuity in the sense that the trust will continue indefinitely; (3)
enforcement is by or through the Attorney General; (4) the trust purpose
is subject to variation under the cy pres power; (5) certain statutes apply
in some jurisdictions, e. g., mortmain statutes of various kinds 2 and tax
exemption statutes. It is at least conceivable that a particular trust might
be charitable for one or more of these purposes but not for others. This
notion limits the authority of a particular case. The tax cases are the most
striking example; 3 other examples will be discussed later. On the other
t B. A., 1922, LL. B., 1925, University of Minnesota; S.J. D., 1926, Harvard University; Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; contributor to legal periodicals.
' (3d ed. 1915) Appendix A.
* The term, is used here in a broad sense to include all express statutory limitations on
the creation of charitable trusts. See Scorr, CASES ON THE LAW oE TRuSTS (2d ed. 1931)
299-302.

' The tax cases often turn on the peculiar wording of the statute, see Philadelphia v.
Masonic Home, 16o Pa. 572, 28 Atl. 954 (1894), or upon its history. See Mayor etc. of
Savannah v. Solomon's Lodge, etc., 53 Ga. 93 (1874). The limited authority of such cases
is recognized in Green's Adm'rs v. Fidelity Trust Co. of Louisville, 134 Ky. 311, 329, 120

S. W. 283, 288 (19o9). For an excellent statement of the relation of the exemption provisions in the federal estate tax statutes to the local law of charitable trusts, see Eagan v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 F. (2d) 881, 883 (C. C. A. 5th, 193o).
Likewise, the cases on exemption from tort liability involve peculiar considerations of
policy. This is shown by an examination of the opinion in the leading case of Union Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Artist, 6o Fed. 365 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894).
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hand, the different classes of cases do react upon each other to some extent,
particularly where the opinion discusses the general problem.
By no means all trusts regarded as charitable include all of these
features. In many charitable trusts there is no perpetuity in any sense. In
fact, there appears to be a growing popular distrust of charities unlimited in
time.4 Furthermore, there is some reason to doubt, as will be developed
later, that all charitable trusts may be without time limit. There is some
indication in a few American cases that the Attorney General is not a necessary party in the enforcement of all charitable trusts.' There is some
language in the books that the judicial cy pres power extends to private
as well as charitable trusts. It is true that courts in the name of construction in private trust cases do things which look like some of the things they
do in charitable trust cases in the name of the cy pres power. Yet it is
believed that the power recognized by the courts is broader in the case of
charitable trusts. On the other hand, the terms of a charitable trust may
preclude cy pres application.
It may be inferred from this discussion that in some situations it makes
no practical difference whether the trust is treated as private or as charitable.
Indeed, such seems to be the case. In a Maine case 6 contributions were
made by many persons after a fire in a town "for the relief of sufferers
by the fire". Only part of the fund was used for immediate relief; the rest
had been invested and the income used for general poor relief. Some of the
fire sufferers brought a bill in equity praying for an accounting and distribution of the remaining funds among the fire sufferers. The bill was sustained
with directions that masters be appointed to receive applications and devise
a scheme for distribution among the fire sufferers, subject to the approval
of the court. The court said that the masters might consider the degree of
suffering. The majority opinion regarded the trust as a private one for the
benefit of an ascertainable class and reasoned that under the rule of construction analogous to the doctrine of cy pres, the surplus should be used
to repair losses as well as to relieve immediate distress. Mr. Justice Haskell
concurred on the ground that this was a public charitable trust, that the
purpose of the donors included property loss, and that it was proper to send
"See Rosenwald, Principles of Public Gizing (1929) 143 ATL. MONTHLY 599; Rosenwvald, The Trend Away From Perpetuities (193o) 146 ATL. MONTHLY 741; Embree, The
Business of Giving Away Monwy (193o) No. 963 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 320; POWELL, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TRuSTS AND ESTATES (1932) 47, n. 53. But cf. Pritchett, The Use and
Abuse of Endowments (1929) 144 ATL. MONTHLY 517.
'See Cannon v. Stephens, 159 Aft. 234 (Del. Ch. 1932). In this case Chancellor Wolcott assumed without deciding that the trust was charitable and overruled a demurrer for
nonjoinder of the Attorney General. See also the cases discussed in (1928) 13 MINN. L.
REV. 653; (1924) 72 U. oF PA. L. REV. 332; ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES (1924)
§ 615; Roland Gray, The Rights of the Donors in Trusts for CharitablePurposes With Special Refereizce to the Law of Massachusetts (1929) 14 MAss. L. Q. 50.
1 Doyle v. Whalen, 87 Me. 414, 32 Atl. 1022 (1895); cf. Bates v. Schillinger, 128 Me. 14.
145 Atl. 395 (1929).
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the matter to masters to devise equitable methods of distribution. It seems
to follow that it is not always enough to consider a particular trust from
the standpoint only of charitable trusts. The trust might be sustained as a
private trust or on some other basis. Also, to repeat, the object of the
trust might be regarded as charitable for some purposes and not for others.
With this much by way of introduction the cases on the more specific
question may be considered. That question is how indefinite the beneficiaries of a charitable trust must be. To put it another way, how small a
class may the settlor choose to benefit and still have the trust treated as
charitable by the courts? It should be stated at the outset that most of the
cases cited by Professor Gray and others do not discuss the problem, although
on their facts it might have been raised. Such cases, of course, have not
the authority of the comparatively few cases where the problem is raised
and discussed. The latter will be emphasized here.
The problem is not properly involved in cases where the purpose is not
regarded as charitable regardless of the size of the class to be benefited.
7
That explains a number of the cases sometimes cited in this connection.
Is the problem raised where the number of persons to be benefited is
small, but the class from which they are to be chosen is large? In Thomas
v. Howell,8 an English case, there was a legacy of £200 to "each of ten poor
clergymen of the Church of England" to be selected by certain named persons. In a suit for the administration of the estate it was contended that
this legacy was charitable within the meaning of the Georgian Mortmain
Act and therefore payable only out of "pure personalty". In opposition to
this contention counsel said, 9 "There are . . . two questions-whether a

gift is charitable, so as to be exempt from the rule against perpetuities, and
another whether it is within the Statute of Mortmain." The legacy was
held not to be within the Mortmain Act. The English textbooks seem to
treat this case as determining that the trust was not charitable for any purpose.10 But the limited nature of the holding was recognized in a Massa'In re Gassiot, 70 L. J. Ch. 242 (igoi) (bequest for the "benefit of individuals who have
been engaged in the Opporto Red or Port St. Mary's White Sherry Vine Trade"; the court
said that the trust was not limited to those who are in poverty or who are aged) ; Iit re

Cullimore's Trusts, L. R. 27 Ir. 18 (i8gi) (bequest "for the benefit and maintenance, and
to enable the families of my late workmen at Ballyanne . . . or their children to become
apprenticed or to immigrate abroad"; the court said that not limited to the poor) ; It re Good
[1905] 2 Ch. 6o (gift of two houses for the use of old officers of a regiment at a small rent;
court construed "old officers" to mean "former", not "aged") ; I; re Drummond [1914] 2
Ch. 9o (bequest for purpose of contribution to holiday expenses of the work people employed

in the spinning department of a company; court said that the trust was not limited to poor
people) ; Minot v. Attorney General, i8g Mass. 176, 75 N. E. 149 (19o5); see Amory v.
Amherst College, 229 Mass. 374, 382, i18 N. E. 933, 936 (igi).
IL. R. I8 Eq. 198 (1874).
9
Id. at 205.
"TUDOR, CHArITIE (5th ed. 1929) 16, n. (p) ; TvssEN, CHARITABLE BEQUEST& (2d ed.
i921) 61; JARMAN, WILLS (7th ed. 193o) 2o8, treating the case as not in accord with other
authorities and unsound.
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chusetts case, Sherman v. Shaw."- That case presented a remarkably similar set of facts. The bequest was of one thousand dollars "to my executor . . . to be by him applied in shares of one hundred dollars each at his
discretion for the benefit and advancement of ten poor boys to be selected
by him." The executor died after disposing of only part of the fund. A
decree that the trust-be carried out by- a trustee appointed by the court was
affirmed on the ground that this was a valid charitable trust. The court discussed Thomas v. Howell and pointed out that the Statute of Mortmain
played a considerable part in that case, that the legacy did not fail, and that
the opinion was not clear. However, if that case decided that the gift was
not a charity under the Statute of Elizabeth, the Massachusetts court refused to follow it. The Massachusetts court considered the bequest before
it as charitable unless the limitation rendered the beneficiaries definite and
certain. The court emphasized the fact that the selection might be from
all poor boys so that no individual could claim participation as a matter of
right, 12 and distinguished cases where the benefit is for a class so limited
in number as not to make the gift for a public benefit. 13
Most of the remaining cases which have been examined group themselves into two classes: (i) trusts for the support and education of relatives; (2) trusts for the benefit of members of associations or societies of
various kinds. These two classes will be discussed first. Any remaining
cases will be treated later.
Support and Education of Relatives
The English cases on gifts for the benefit of the settlor's poor relatives are divided in the latest edition of Jarman, Wills,"4 into gifts for
perpetual benefit and immediate gifts. The former are said to be good
charitable gifts, and there are several cases so holding.1' The cases are
2243

Mass.

257, 137 N. E. 374 (1922).

" This

persuasive reasoning would warrant a different decision than that reached in
Estate of Huebner, 127 Cal. App. 244, 15 P. (2d) 758 (1932), where the court refused to
sustain as a charitable trust a testamentary provision for a fund, the interest of which was
to be used "to help defray the expense of educating some girl or boy", to be selected by a
named person, in music or art. The court took quite literally the language in the cases defining charitable trusts as being for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons.
'Referring to Kent v. Dunham, 142 Mass. 216, 7 N. E. 730 (1886) as interpreted in
Sears v. Attorney General, 193 Mass. 551, 79 N. E. 772 (19o7).

' Op. cit. supra note

10, 209-210.

'White v. White, 7 Ves. 423 (18o2) (bequest of fund for purpose of "putting out 'our
poor relations' apprentices"; confined by codicil to two families) ; Attorney General v. Price,
17 Ves. 371 (I8Io) (also territorial limitation-those dwelling within a certain county);
Gillam v. Taylor, L. R. 16 Eq. 581 (1873) (lineal descendants of brother of testator's
mother) ; cf. Bernal v. Bernal, 7 L. J. Ch. 115 (1838) (governed by law of Holland) ; Re
Rosenblum, 131 L. T. 21 (1924) (testamentary transfer to Jiidischer Nationalfonds Company for purpose of purchasing land in Palestine and enabling descendants of testator's
father to settle there; apparently not regarded by the court as transfer on trust but rather
as beneficial gift to the company).
Attorney-General v. Duke of Northumberland, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 745 (1877) probably supports the statement in the text although the court construed the will as merely giving a pref-
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not so clear as to immediate gifts. In most of the cases the benefit- has
been limited to poor 16 relatives within the statute of distributions, and
there has been no reference to the gift as charitable. 1 7 In a few cases,
however, the word "charity" has been used, and the trust has not been
There are a number of English
limited to persons within the statute.'
cases holding that gifts to colleges for the education of relatives are
charitable.' 0
In none of the cases so far discussed is there any discussion of the
effect of the smallness of the class. However, in the Irish case of Laverence to poor kindred. The only question litigated was whether surplus income should be
used for persons not kindred. The court declared that the income was applicable primarily
for the relief of kindred and the surplus for other charitable uses fpr the poor. The court
construed the word "poorest" in the will as meaning "very poor". Jarman cites in this connection the case of Isaac v. Defriez, Ambl. 595, 17 Ves. 373 n. 1 (1754). The two reports
of this case differ somewhat, but neither makes it clear whether or not there was a perpetuity.
The case is relied upon in some of the cases cited above in this note.
"Those chosen to benefit must be poor. Carr v. Bedford, 2 Ch. Rep. 146 (1678) (but
see comment on this case in Gray, Powers in Trust and Gifts Implied in Default of Appointinent (1911) 25 HARv. L. REv. i, 4, n. 4) ; Griffith v. Jones, 2 Ch. Rep. 394 (1686); BrunsBut see Widmore v. Woodroffe, Ambl. 636, 64o
den v. Woolredge, Ambl. 507 (1765).
(1766). In Gower v. Mainwaring, 2 Ves. Sr. 87, i1O (1750) two of the trustees had died
and the third refused to act; the court directed that the master consider the necessities and
circumstances of the relatives.
' Carr v. Bedford; Griffith v. Jones, both sup-a note 16; Goodinge v. Goodinge, i Ves.
Sr. 231 (1749) (court relied on word "nearest" in will referring to relations) ; Edge v. Salisbury, Ambl. 70 (1749) (here again f6r "nearest relations") ; Brunsden v. Woolredge; Widmore v. Woodroffe, both supra note 16. To the same effect, probably, is Gower v. Mainwaring, supra note 16, although the opinion is not very clear. The words "friends and
relations" were construed as synonymous. Green v. Howard, i Bro. C. C. 31 (1779), cited
in GRAY, op. cit. supra note i, at 532, n. 3, does not seem to be in point because there was
nothing in the will about the relatives being poor.
Likewise in Liley v. Hey, i Hare 580 (1842), the court did not seem to treat the devise
as limited to the poor. The trust was for distribution of rents among the families of certain
named persons "according to their circumstances, as, in the opinion of the said trustees, they
may need such assistance". The effect of the quoted words was not considered in the opinion.
It was held that the trust was not void. It was not charitable within the Mortmain Act. It
did not violate the rule against perpetuities at least during the lives of the persons named who
had an immediate claim; that subsequent interests might be void for remoteness did not invalidate the present interests. See the comment on that case in JA.RMAN, loc. cit. supra
note Io.
'Attorney General v. Buckland (1742) cited in Ambl. 71; Mahon v. Savage, " Sch. &
Lef. iii (18o3). In the latter case, which was in the High Court of Chancery in Ireland,
the bequest was to be distributed among testator's poor relations or such other objects of
charity as should be mentioned in his private instructions. No such instructions were given.
In JARMAN, WILTS (7th ed. 193o) 21o, it is said that this case is distinguishable from a simple gift to poor relations because of the additional indication of a charitable object. But
quaere.
In Attorney General v. Bucknall, 2 Atk. 328 (1741) there is no suggestion of any restriction on the class of relatives to be benefited. Nor was there any such suggestion in Waldo
v. Caley, 16 Ves. 206 (18o9) (merely preference to poor relations). The two reports of
Isaac v. Defriez, supra note I5, seem to be somewhat inconsistent on this point.
'Flood's Case, Hobart 136 (I616) ("to find a scholar of his [testator's] blood from
time to time") ; Attorney General v. Sidney Sussex College, 34 Beav. 654 (I865), L. R. 4
Ch. App. 722 (1869) (for the education of the descendants of the brothers and sisters of
testator and of his two wives "or in default of such, to their next poore kindred") ; In re
Lavelle [1914] I Ir. R. 194 (interest to go forever "towards the education of my relations"
in the college) ; cf. Spencer v. All Souls College, Wilm. 163 (1762) (founder of college
provided for preference of relatives; preference held not limited to those of close relation;
no statement that this was a charitable trust) ; White v. White, supra note 15 (fund for
purpose of "putting out 'our poor relations' apprentices"; confined to two families by
codicil; held valid as charitable trust).
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erty v. Laverty 2 0 there is some hint at least of that problem. The testator,
O'Laverty, left property on trust, the income to be disposed of "towards
the support and education . . . of any . . . boy or boys . . . of the
surname of O'Laverty or Laverty . . . until such boy . . . shall have

obtained a trade or profession." The trust was held to be invalid. It
could not be sustained as a private trust because the class was not ascertainable and because there was a perpetuity. It was not charitable as for
the relief of poverty because the benefits were not limited to poor persons. 21 Furthermore, the court regarded it as not educational in the
charities sense because it might work as a mere matter of private bounty,
e. g., for the employing of a tutor for some wealthy young Laverty. However, there was a didtum that there might be a valid charitable trust for the
advancement of education with a preference for persons of a particular
surname.
The American cases are more critical of trusts for the support of
poor relatives or the education of relatives. The leading case is Kent v.
Dunham,22 a Massachusetts case. The trust was for the appropriation
of "such part of the principal and interest as they [the trustees] may
deem best, for the aid and support of those of my children and their descendants who may be destitute, and in the opinion of said trustees need
such aid." The court took the position that the gift was too remote, as
tending to create a perpetuity, unless it could be sustained as a public charity. After referring to a number of the English cases, pointing out that
in some of them the question of validity was not raised, and attempting
to distinguish all of them, the court held that the trust was not charitable.
The court said:
" . . . In the expectation of the remote contingency that there
shall be a descendant who is a destitute person, the fund is to be permitted to accumulate. .

.

.

There is no general public object sufficient to

justify this accumulation, in the possible advantage which the public
may obtain by having the descendants of the testator protected from
beggary, and thus from becoming a public charge. To establish, as
a permanent charity, a provision for a single
family .
23
foreign to tho general principles of our law. . . . "

.

. would be

In a later Massachusetts case,24 the court referred to the previous case
as follows:
" . . . We infer, although the statement in the opinion is not in
these terms, that one reason of the decision is that the class was not
[19o7] i Ir. R. 9.
Compare the remarks of Jessel, M. R., in Attorney General v. Duke of Northumberland, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 745 (1877).
'Supra note 13.
'Id. at 219, 7 N. E. at 733.
' Sears v. Attorney General, supra note 13, at 554, 79 N. E. at 773.
'
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sufficiently large and indefinite to make the gift of common and public benefit."
This no doubt was one of the reasons in Kent v. Dunham, but it was
combined with the perpetuity aspects upon which the court placed strong
emphasis. Where that combination exists, there is considerable American authority to the same effect as Kent v. Dunham." On the other
hand, trusts otherwise charitable are sustained in spite of provisions for
preference of relatives of the settlor. 28 It is quite conceivable that in
some cases those preferred might exhaust the benefits at any given time.
Possibly there might be some limits upon validity depending on the
27
apparent motive of the settlor.
There is less uniformity in the cases where distribution within the
period of the rule against perpetuities is contemplated. In some cases the
trust is treated as charitable. 28 In others the benefit has been limited to
those relatives within the statute of distributions with a power of selection
in the trustee.29 In an early Connecticut case the trustees died without
'Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134 N. E. 276 (1922) ("such of my brothers and
sisters and their wives and husbands and their children as may need, or in the opinion of
my said trustees should receive, any aid or support"); In re Moller's Estate, 178 N. Y.
Supp. 682 (1919) (following a dictum in Matter of MacDowell, 217 N. Y. 454, 463, 112
N. E. 177 (ii6); see also Matter of Beekman, 232 N. Y. 365, 375, 134 N. E. 183, 186
(1922) (tax case); Johnson v. De Pauw University, 116 Ky. 671, 678, 76 S. W. 851, 853
(19o3) (education of descendants of testator's father and maternal grandfather; dictum
that not valid charitable trust). In the last case the court said, "This devise was in no
sense for a general public use, nor was it given with motives free from the stain of everything that is personal, private, or selfish." In In re Moller's Estate, supra, the court made
a vigorous argument against the view it felt bound to follow.
'Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465 (U. S. 186o) ; Dexter v. Harvard College, 176 Mass.
192, 57 N. E. 371 (igoo); Darcy v. Kelley, 153 Mass. 433, 26 N. E. iiiO (i891); Matter
of MacDowell, supra note 25; Franklin v. Armfield, 2 Sneed 3o5 (Tenn. 1854) ; Gallaher
v. Gallaher, io6 W. Va. 588, 146 S. E. 623 (1929) ; Flaherty's Estate, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas, 186
(Pa. 1851) ; Tarver v. Weaver, 221 Ala. 663, 130 So. 209 (1930) (no discussion of preference provision) ; see Kent v. Dunham, supra note 13, at 217, 7 N. E. at 731; Matter of
Beekman, supra note 25, at 376, 134 N. E. at 187; Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173, 193

(1863).
'Yet the trust was sustained in Franklin v. Armfield, supra note 26, where a school
vas to be established for the education of the children of testator and his brothers and
sisters and the descendants of such children, and "if the revenues . . . should be sufficient," poor children of a certain place who were selected by the trustees were to be
educated and supported at the school. The testator's primary motive seems to have been
the education of relatives. Cf. Flaherty's Estate; Darcy v. Kelly, both supra note 26
(relatively small amount involved).
'*Swasey v. American Bible Society, 57 Me. 523 (1869) (bequests for: education of
a pious relative who shall be a student for the ministry; benefit of the "poor and needy of
my relatives") ; Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N. H. 354, IO Atl. 706 (1887) (interest of a fund
to be applied for a term of ten years "for the relief of the most destitute of my relatives
not to extend beyond the children of my brothers and sisters and their families"). Both
cases raised the question of the validity of the trusts. The Maine case would seem not to
involve a perpetuity. The opinion is not full and does not discuss the smallness of the class
to be benefited. The New Hampshire case, likewise, does not discuss the smallness of the
class; rather the discussion is of whether the trust is too uncertain. The earlier New
Hampshire case, Goodale v. Mooney, infra note 29, is not mentioned.
'Bronson v. Strouse, 57 Conn. 147, 17 Atl. 699 (1889) (for maintenance and support
of "such of my heirs at law as shall or may be in need of pecuniary assistance" with times
and amount left to option of executors; court limited benefits to those under the statute
in being at testator's death in order to avoid violation of statute against perpetuities);
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making the distribution; the court distributed among the most needy of
the class. 30 The Virginia court, however, refused to follow that case and
declared for all of those within the statute on the ground that the court
could not ascertain the most needy.3 1
Benefit of Members of Associations and Societies
Those cases of this type which refuse to treat the trust as charitable
are explainable usually on some basis other than the smallness of the class
to be benefited. Thus a trust to expend the income for the general purposes
of a fraternal organization has been held to be invalid because all such purposes were not charitable.3 2 Likewise, the funds of mutual benefit societies
have sometimes been regarded as not held for charitable purposes on the
ground that the contributions were for the personal advantage of the contributors or their families-in effect a business arrangement.3 3 However,
Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 28 N. W. 353 (1886) (bequest said to be "charitable in
its purpose") ; see Goodale v. Mooney, 6o N. H. 528, 536 (1881) ; cf. Wright's Estate, 284
Pa. 334, 131 AtI. 188 (1925), where the trust was for distribution for a certain charitable
purpose but with authority in the trustees to pay from income to testator's nephews and
nieces such sums as in their discretion may be necessary. The court said that the provision
for the "needy" (the court's term) relatives was not a charity, but it was valid nevertheless
since it did not violate the rule against perpetuities because restricted (by the court's construction) to those in existence at the testator's death. The provision was regarded as
incidental to the main trust and temporary. Likewise in Wilce v. Van Anden, 248 Ill. 358,
362, 94 N. E. 42, 44 (1911), where the trustees were to give "such part . . . as they may

think best . . . to any one or more of my brothers or sisters that may stand in need of
the same" and the remainder to certain charities, the provision for the relatives was said
to be a private trust. The court conceded that if both purposes were charitable the trust
could be upheld. But the entire trust was held to fail because of the failure to divide the
fund between the two purposes. Cf. Minot v. Attorney General, supra note 7. But cf.
Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 48 N. E. 561, 49 N. E. 32o (1897).
'Bull v. Bull, 8 Conn. 47 (183o) (to two brothers of testator to dispose of it "among
our brothers and sisters, and their children, as they shall judge shall be most in need of the
same"; sufficient designation of the persons to prevent the trust from being void for uncertainty; class to be determined as of the death of the testator).
31Fontaine's
Adm'r v. Thompson's Adm'r, So Va. 229 (1885); cf. McNeilledge v.
Galbraith, 8 S. & R. 43 (Pa. 1822) (at wife's death "to be divided between her and my
poor relations equally"; word "poor" disregarded because of practical difficulties in distinguishing between degrees of poverty); McNeilledge v. Barclay, ii S. & R.. 1O3 (Pa.
1823).

Mason v. Perry, 22 R. I. 475, 48 Ati. 671 (19O) (dictum that relief of needy members of lodge is charitable) ; cf. Bangor v. Masonic Lodge, 73 Me. 428 (I882) (tax case) ;
Estate of Wirt, 2o7 Cal. 1o6, 277 Pac. 118 (1929) (proof directed as to character of the
lodges). But cf. Cruse v. Axtell, 50 Ind. 49 (1875) ; Duke v. Fuller, 9 N. H. 536 (1838) ;
City of Petersburg v. Petersburg Benevolent Mechanics Ass'n, 78 Va. 431 (1884) (tax
case) ; Kauffman v. Foster, 3 Cal. App. 741, 86 Pac. xloS (19o6) (but see concurring
opinion). In a few cases a trust for a lodge seems to be treated as a private trust. Brown
v. Webb, 6o Ore. 526, 120 Pac. 387 (i912); King v. Parker, 9 Cush. 71 (Mass. 15i);
cf. Vander Volgen v. Yates, 3 Barb. Ch. 242 (N. Y. 1848), affd 9 N. Y. 219 (1853). This
may be quite proper where there is no restriction on the purposes for which the property
is to be used and no perpetuity. See TRUSTS REST-A.MENT, Tentative Draft No. I (Am.
L. Inst. 1930) § 115, dealing with trusts for unincorporated associations. Quaere, whether
that explains King v. Parker, supra.
mAnon., 3 Atk. 277 (1745) (said to be in "nature only of a private charity"; therefore
Attorney General was not a necessary party) ; In re Clark's Trust, I Ch. D. 497 (1875)
(benefits not limited to poor members; cy pres application of fund bequeathed to the society
refused) ; Cunnack v. Edwards [1896] 2 Ch. 679 (question of distribution of funds when
society became extinct; benefits not limited to poor widows; cy pres application refused) ;
Braithwaite v. Attorney-General [1909] I Ch. 51o (distribution of two funds, one con-
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a different conclusion is reached when the benefit is limited to poor members.34 Furthermore, there appears to be another exception based on the
actual or potential size of the society. 5 An English case 31 and a Massachusetts case 37 present an interesting comparison.

In both cases the original

trust was admittedly charitable, and the question was whether the proposed
application of the fund was proper. In the English case the court sanctioned
the proposal and ordered the fund to be transferred to the trustees of a
Friendly Society for the relief of members suffering from colliery accidents
in a certain district. This order was made in spite of the objection that
poverty was not necessary for relief under the rules of the society. In the
Massachusetts case the proposal included turning over part of the fund to
two incorporated mutual benefit associations, the Boston Teachers' Association and the Bank Officers' Association of Boston, each of which was organized for the giving of charitable assistance to sick and disabled members. The
court approved the proposal, citing the English case and emphasizing the
fact that through the years an indefinite number of persons would be members and that all public school teachers and bank officers and clerks in the
city were eligible for membership in the respective societies.
Gifts the benefit of which is limited to members of a particular religious
38
society have been sustained as charitable.

Likewise, gifts for the benefit of the poor members of a lodge or their
families generally have been regarded as creating charitable trusts.39 This
tributed by honorary members, the other by benefited members; benefits not limited to
poor members; cy pres application of either fund refused) ; Coe v. Washington Mills, 149
Mass. 543, 21 N. E. 966 (1889) (distribution; said not to be a public charity which can
be administered cy pres; payments by members like insurance premiums) ; cf. Neptune
Fire Engine and Hose Co. v. Board of Education, 166 Ky. I, 178 S. W. 1138 (1915);
Swift's Executors v. Easton Beneficial Society, 73 Pa. 362 (1873) (mortmain statute);
Sharp's Estate, 71 Pa. Super. 34 (1918) (mortmain statute).
"Spiller v. Maude, 32 Ch. D. i58 n. (i88i) (cy pres application); It re Buck [1896]
2 Ch. 727 (bequest to Friendly Society rules of which pointed to poverty; cy pres applica149and
(mortmain
act).
2 Ch.
tion);
cf. addition
lit re Lacey
'o In
to the[1899]
English
case
the American
case discussed in the text, consult
R.
314 (1893) (mortmain statute; court
190,
3
Pa.
Dist.
Jeanes's Estate, 34 W. N. Cas.
cited Gray and relied on his analysis). The Pennsylvania cases suggest a third exception,
viz., where the benefit is not limited to the members of the society. Potts v. Philadelphia
Association, 8 Phila. 326 (1871) (member not permitted to withdraw from the fund);
Lawson's Estate, 264 Pa. 77, 1O7 Atl. 376 (1919) (mortmain statute); cf. Minns v. Billings, 183 Mass. 126, 66 N. E. 593 (19o3) (members and other needy persons connected

with the printing business).
Pease v. Pattinson, 32 Ch. D. 154 (1886) (no discussion of smallness of class).
Minns v. Billings, supra note 35.
Trustees v. Wilkinson, 36 N. J. Eq. 141 (1882),

aff'd 38 N. J. Eq. 514 (1884)

(interest to be applied forever to the poor members of two incorporated churches of Camden); Eliot's Appeal, 74 Conn. 586, 51 Atl. 558 (1902) (home for aged or infirm ladies
connected with the society; public in sense that not selfish and hence protected against
effect of rule against perpetuities) ; see Richtman v. Watson, I5o Wis. 385, 136 N. W. 797
(1912); cf. Witman v. Lex, 17 S. & R. 88 (Pa. 1827); Gass and Bonta v. Wilhite, 2 Dana

lo6 (Ky. 1834) ; Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809 (1899) ; Bates v. Schillinger,
supra note 6 (distinguishing gift to those who were members at death of testatrix).
"Roberts v. Corson, 79 N. H. 215, lO7 Atl. 625, 5 A. L. R. 1172 (1919) (court said the
trust was for benefit of a definite section of the public, and it was immaterial as to validity
how large or small the section was) ; Humphrey v. Board of Trustees of I. 0. 0. F. Home,
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result was reached in some of the cases over the objection that the benefited
class was too small.4 0 An outstanding exception to this current of authority
is a Kansas case 4 1 involving a deed to trustees on trust to "provide a home
upon said premises for the orphan children of deceased Odd Fellows of the
State of Kansas." In a four to three decision the deed was held to be void
on the ground that it violated the rule against perpetuities since the trust was
not a public charity. The majority opinion took the novel position that a
public charity is a gift to a public object which the state itself, with public
resources, might foster.42 It also rebutted the argument that the public
burden is relieved pro tanto by saying that such an argument would support
a trust for destitute descendants of the settlor, referring to Kent v. Dunham
discussed above.43 The dissenting opinions are more convincing and certainly better supported by the cases in other jurisdictions.
Other Related Cases
Professor Gray placed considerable reliance on the "much-considered"
English case of Goodman v. Mayor of Saltah,44 and indeed it is most interesting on its facts and because of the opinions rendered. In the House of
Lords the evidence was said to show a grant to the corporation (Borough
of Saltash) of a fishery subject to a condition or proviso that the free inhabitants of ancient tenements in the borough should be entitled to fish during
a certain season. This was said to be a charitable trust which cannot be
203 N. C. 2oI, 165 S. E.547 (1932) (education of one of white girl inmates of the Home to
be selected from time to time; no discussion of smallness of class) ; Green's Adm'rs v.
Fidelity Trust Company, supra note 3 (institution for orphans of Free Masons of Indiana;
court rejected contention that mere private charity and void as offending the statute prohibiting perpetuities) ; Estate of Willed, 128 Cal. i, 6o Pac. 471 (igoo) (for the "use of
the widows' and orphans' fund" of certain Masonic bodies; the court said it was sufficient
that the purpose was charitable regardless of whether or not the Masonic body was a
charitable institution); Heiskell v. Chickasaw Lodge, 87 Tenn. 668, II S. W. 825 (1889)
(dividends to be used for benefit of widows and orphans of members of the lodge; some
language in the opinion that uncertainty of beneficiaries is indispensable to all charities) ;
cf. Masonic Education and Charity Trust v. Boston, 2Ol Mass. 32o, 87 N. E. 6o2 (i9o9)

(tax case; beneficiaries indefinite although limited to a class) ; Grand Lodge v. Board of
Review, 281 Ill. 480, 117 N. E. io16 (917)

(tax case; for a public charity benefit must

not be conferred upon certain and defined persons, but class may be limited); Price v.
Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23 (1857) (mortmain statute; charitable though benefits confined to a
particular class); Guilfoil v. Arthur, i58 Ill. 60, 41 N. E. io9 (1895); Tate v. Woodyard, 145 Ky. 613, i4o S.W. io44 (1911); Milligan v. Greenville College, 156 Tenn. 495,
2 S. W. (2d) 9o (1928) (court emphasized fact that no perpetuity involved; also that gift
was to a charitable corporation) ; State ex rel. Crutze v. Toney, 141 Ore. 4o6, 17 P. (2d)
1105 (1933).

I Notably Roberts v. Corson; Green's Adm'rs v. Fidelity Trust Company, both supra
note 39.
Troutman v. De Boissiere, 66 Kan. I, 71 Pac. 286 (i9o3). This was on rehearing.
The opposite result had been reached, five to two, in a previous hearing. 64 Pac. 33 (Kan.
19oI). The opinions on both hearings are reported in 5 L. R. A. (N. s.) 692 (i9oi); cf.
dicta in Moseley v. Smiley, 171 Ala. 593, 55 So. 143 (1911).
'This language was explained away to some extent in Washburn College v. O'Hara,
75 Kan. 70o, 9o Pac. 234 (i9o7) ; cf. Treadwell v. Beebe, 1o7 Kan. 31, 38, 190 Pac. 768, 772
(1920).

Text, supra page 17.

"7 App. Cas. 633 (1882).
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void on the ground of perpetuity. In the opinion of Earl Cairns it was
said : 45
"Where you have a trust which, if it were for the benefit of private
individuals or a fluctuating body of private individuals, would be void
on the ground of perpetuity, yet if it creates a charitable, that is to say
a public, interest, it will be free from any obnoxiousness to the rule with
regard to perpetuities."
On the other hand, Lord Blackburn in his dissenting opinion made the following remarks : 46
"And though there are many cases to the effect that a trust for
public purposes, not confined to the poor, may be considered charitable
for many purposes, I do not know of any that say that such a trust as is
now supposed would be taken out of the rule against perpetuities."
The case has influenced the decisions in a few other somewhat similar Eng47
lish cases.
Trusts for religious purposes seem to be in a class by themselves. This
is shown by Sears v. Attorney General,48 a Massachusetts case. There the
trust was "for the benefit of the widows and orphan children that may be left
by the future ministers" of a certain church. After raising but not deciding
the question of whether the trust was a public charity solely in its eleemosynary aspect, the court held that the trust was a religious charity and subject
to a cy pres application. The fund was regarded as a gift for the support
of the rector, 49 and it was pointed out that most churches seek to promote
religion and morality among the people generally.5'
Probably similar ideas
'Id. at 65o-65i.
"Id. at 662. Italics are the author's. However, Lord Blackburn did not venture to
differ from the others on the perpetuities question. Rather he questioned whether a trust
should be presumed.
'In re Christchurch Inclosure Act, 38 Ch. D. 520 (1888) (land allotted under Inclosure
Act to lord of manor in trust for occupiers of certain cottages: as a turf common; part of
fund arising from sale of part of land held to be subject to a charitable trust with liberty to
the Attorney General to apply for a cy pres order; no perpetuities question because trust
created by statute; class limited but liable to fluctuation), aff'd on appeal on other grounds in
Attorney General v. Meyrick [1893] A. C. I; It re Norwich Town Close Estate Charity, 40
Ch. D. 298 (1888) (city trustee for freemen for the time being of the city; jurisdiction on a
summons under the Charitable Trusts Act).
' Supra note 13. Professor Gray was of counsel.
'Some reliance was placed upon the provisions that the fund, if large enough, was to
be used also for the bishop of Massachusetts when a rector of the church and for other
objects connected with the church. Some earlier Massachusetts cases were regarded as having been overruled, at least to some extent, including Old South Society v. Crocker, ig Mass.
I (1875). But cf. Bullock v. Long, 260 Mass. 129, 156 N. E. 743 (927) (tax case).
' Cf. Attorney General v. Cock, 2 Ves. Sr. 273 (1751) (support of minister) ; Attorney
General v. Goddard, T. & R. 348 (1823) (support of minister) ; I re St. Stephen, 39 Ch. D.
492 (1888) (grant of advowson to trustees for benefit of the parish and bequest on trust for
providing a vicarage house; held to be a charitable trust within the City of London Parochial
Charities Act and not void as a perpetuity) ; In re Bell's Will, 141 Misc. 720, 253 N. Y. Supp.
118 (ig3i) (minister's salary) ; Holton v. Elliott, I93 N. C. 708, I38 S. E. 3 (1927) (home
for minister) ; Attorney General v. Dublin, 38 N. H. 459 (1859) (support of minister).
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of indirect public benefit sustain some educational gifts, e. g., the endowment
of professorships 51 and the creation of scholarships. 52
Trusts the benefits of which are limited to the employees of a business
have been considered in a few cases. An English case 53 involved a bequest
to be invested by the trustees to form a fund for the purpose of pensioning
off the old and worn-out clerks of a firm of which the testator was a member.
This was held to be a good charitable gift the benefits of which would include
clerks becoming such after the testator's death, and the trustees were directed
to bring in a scheme. The court said:
"The fact that the section of the public is limited to persons born
or residing in a particular parish, district, or county, or belonging to
or connected with any special sect, denomination, guild, institution, firm,
name, or family, does not of itself render that which would be otherwise
charitable void for lack of a sufficient or satisfactory description or take
it out of the category of charitable gifts." "
Finally, there are many cases where trusts with territorial and other
limitations upon the possible beneficiaries have been regarded as charitable.
Examples are cited in the footnotes. A few discuss the narrowness of the
class; 5 more do not.5 6
Cheeseman v. Partridge, i Atk. 436 (i739); Catron v. Scarritt Collegiate Institute,
264 Mo. 713, '75 S. W. 571 (915)

(endowment of president's chair said to be for benefit of

students and to release other funds of the school; fund should be applied cy pres when school
combined with another school) ; see Dexter v. Harvard College, supra note 26.
'aHoyt v. Bliss, 93 Conn. 344, 105 Atl. 699 (i919)

(restricted to residents of Danbury,

Connecticut; not invalid because no distinction between rich and poor) ; see Dexter v. Harvard College, supra note 26.

'Ilt re Gosling, 48 W. R. 300 (i9oo) ; cf. Attorney-General v. Ironmonger's Company,

Beav. 313, 327 (840); Eagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra note 3 (tax
case; charitable in spite of limitation of beneficiaries to employees and their families; at
testator's death employees numbered 1,47o and dependents about 6,ooo-hence a considerable
portion of the public).
"S pra note 53, at 301.
' Bullard v. Chandler, i49 Mass. 532, 21 N. E. 951 (889) ("to the relief and comfort
of the poor and unfortunate whom we have aided in past years, and also to others as their
judgment may dictate") ; Kitchen v. Pitney, 94 N. J. Eq. 485, II9 Atl. 675 (1923) ("home
for aged and respectable white bachelors and widowers, who may have, through misfortune,
lost the means which they once had for their own support, and have become wholly or partially unable to support themselves") ; cf. Carter v. Whitcomb, 74 N. H. 482, 69 Atl. 779
(I9o8) (tax case; bequest to Women's Relief Corps of Nashua, N. H., an auxiliary to the
Grand Army of the Republic).
"Wright v. Hobert, 9 Mod. 64 (1723) (conveyance of land to trustees "to the intent,
that as many of the inhabitants of that village as were able to buy three cows might put them
there to grass" during a certain period of the year forever and during another period "to be
in common for all the inhabitants") ; Bristow v. Bristow, 5 Beav. 289 (1842) (interest to be
given every year "for the relief of the poor on my little estate in Suffolk") ; Thompson v.
Thompson, I Coll. 381 (844) (income to be used in part in perpetuity for weekly gift of
bread to sixteen poor old persons residing in certain parish and in part for assisting unsuccessful but deserving "literary men") ; lit re Good, supra note 7 (bequest upon trust for
officers' mess of testator's regiment; income for library and plate; court stressed public benefit in increase of efficiency of army); Holmes v. Coates, I59 Mass. 226, 34 N. E. i9o (1893)
(benefit of disabled soldiers and seamen who served in the Union Army in the Civil War and
their widows and orphans) ; Attorney General v. Goodell, i8o Mass. 538, 62 N. E. 962 (I9o2)
(to be divided "among the poor colored people of the city of Lynn") ; Attorney General v.
Bedard, 218 Mass. 378, io5 N. E. 993 (1914) (relief fund for striking operatives in textile
mills of Lawrence, Mass.) ; Beardsley v. Selectmen of Bridgeport, 5 Conn. 489, 3 Atl. 557
2
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Conclusion
The idea that there are minimum limits to the size of the class to be
benefited by a charitable trust is largely of American origin and development.
No clear-cut discussion or even recognition of any such requirement has been
found in the English cases. The American cases, on the other hand, abound
with dicta on the subject; also there are a considerable number of American
cases where the requirement was stated and applied to the particular situations. However, the number of instances of a trust failing on that ground
are few indeed. In fact, the only situation as to which the courts have reached
fairly general agreement is the trust, unlimited in time, for the support or
education of relatives. Such a trust involves an element of selfishness in the
family restriction.
In that type of case, the American courts have departed definitely from
the English authorities and have held such trusts to be invalid, emphasizing
the narrowness of the class and the element of a perpetuity. On the other
hand, in both countries, such trusts have been sustained on one theory or
another when no perpetuity was involved. It is true that this distinction is
not made explicit, but it is at least implicit in the American emphasis on the
perpetuity element, where it is present, and in the actual difference in results
in the American cases. Furthermore, it is submitted that the distinction has
merit. Although there may be a policy against permitting a person to provide in perpetuity for his relatives who are in need of support or education,
no such policy would seem to apply where the fund is to be expended immediately or within the period of the rule against perpetuities.
In the latter situation it has been seen that some of the cases limit the
benefits to relatives within the class fixed by the statute of distributions.
This looks much like a private trust for relatives with a power of selection
in the trustees. 57 On the other hand, in a number of cases, both English
and American, the trust has been treated as charitable with, apparently, no
limitation to persons within the statute. 8 Perhaps the important thing is
(1885) (for the benefit of the "worthy, deserving, poor, white, American, Protestant, Democratic widows and orphans residing in the town of Bridgeport") ; Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S.
557, 13 Sup. Ct. 503 (1893) (supporting institution "to furnish a retreat and home for disabled or aged and infirm and deserving American mechanics") ; Wright v. Linn, 9 Pa. 433
(1848) (conveyance of land for school house free for all inhabitants residing nearer thereto
than to any other public school) ; Darcey v. O'Brien, 65 F. (2d) 599 (App. D. C. 1933)
(patients in a certain hospital) ; see Cannon v. Stephens, supra note 5.
" Compare cases like Harding v. Glyn, i Atk. 469 (1739) ; see also TRUSTS R.ESTATEmENT, Tentative Draft No. I (Am. L. Inst. 193o) § 117.
In fact, these "poor relatives," cases seem to go farther in restricting the beneficiaries, so
far as they restrict even the trustee in selection. They go no farther in restricting the class
where the trustee is dead or has refused to act. See Gower v. Mainwaring, supra note 16.
c So far as these cases do not limit the trustee in selection, they are not inconsistent
with the cases of private trusts for relatives. See TRUSTS RESTATFMENT, loc. cit. supra note
57. But if the trustee did not distribute and the court itself did not limit the benefits to those
within the statute, there would be a departure from the private trust cases. That question
was not clearly raised and passed upon in any of the cases examined. It was involved in
Attorney-General v. Bucknall, supra note 18, where the trustee had died, but there was no
discussion of it.
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that the trusts are sustained on one theory or the other. Yet the charity theory
seems more desirable. The other theory does violence to the settlor's intention.59 The charity theory also giVes leeway for the exercise of the cy pres
power in case the trustee does not make the selection.
It is conceivable that other situations may arise in which, because of
the smallness of the class to be benefited, it is not desirable to sustain as charitable a trust in perpetuity. However, if the trust does not tend to perpetuity and if the beneficiaries are not sufficiently definite for a private trust
without a strained construction defeating the settlor's intention, it is submitted that it should be sustained as a charitable trust. In other words, some
trust objects may not be charitable for the purpose of the rule against perpetuities 1o but may be charitable for the purpose of the rule against indefiniteness of the beneficiaries of non-charitable trusts and the cy pres power
and perhaps other purposes.
In closing, this problem is related to the rule of Morice v. The Bishop
of Durham 61 against indefiniteness of the beneficiaries of non-charitable
trusts. That rule is at best an arbitrary one. The courts have developed an
exception to it in the "honorary" or "specific purpose" trust cases.62 Also
an escape from the rule has been worked out for some situations in the cases
where the transferee is said to have an "unrestricted power of disposition." 63
The position here taken offers another exception or partial escape where the
trust object is not charitable in the fullest sense.
' Particularly in those cases which disregarded the word "poor". See notes 16 and 31.
o' In the sense of a limit upon duration, as in the so-called "honorary" or "specific purpose" trust cases. See Smith, Honorary Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities (ip3o) 30
COL. L. REv. 6o, discussing ably whether it is the rule against perpetuities or some analogous
rule which applies to such trusts; see also TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, Tentative Draft No. L
(Am. L. Inst. I93O)"§ Ig.
lio Ves. 52I (1805).
'As to the rule and its exceptions, see Ames, The Failureof the "Tilden Trust" (1892)
5 HARv. L. REv. 389; AMES, LEcTumEs oN LEAAL HISTORY (913) 285; Gray, Gifts for a
Non-CharitablePurpose (1962) 15 HARv. L. REy. 509; GRAY, op. cit. supra note I, Appendix
H; Scott, Coutrol, of Property by the Dead (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 527, 538; Smith,
supra note 6o; TRUSTS PESTATEMENT, Tentative Draft No. I (Am. L. Inst. 193o) §§ 115,
II8, 119.
' Norman v. Prince, 4o R. I. 402, IO Atl. 126 (1917), discussed in (1918) 31 HARv. L.
REv. 661; Beals v. Villard, 268 Mass. I29, 167 N. E. 264 (1929), discussed in (I93O) 14
MINN. L. REV. 310; TRUSTS RESTATEmENT, Tentative Draft No. I (Am. L. Inst. 193o) § 121.
Compare the devious and doubtful reasoning employed to escape from the rule in In re Clarke
37 HRv. L. REv. 277.
[1923] 2 Ch. 407, discussed in (923)

